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embark on its “Titoist” escapade. The
de-Stalinization theme set by the Twen-
tieth Communist Party Congress of the
Soviet Union in February 1956 made a
major impact on Soviet thinking. Nikita
Khrushchev, Anastas Mikoyan, and
even such hard-liners as Mikhail Suslov
seemed predisposed to allow Budapest a
significant degree of autonomy in its in-
terpretation of communism. Were it
not for the massacre of party officials in
Budapest’s Republic Square, Gati ar-
gues, the revolution stood an excellent
chance to succeed.
Perhaps the bigger nemesis was Wash-
ington. The combined incompetence of
the Central Intelligence Agency; the mis-
guided, provocative propaganda of the
Radio Free Europe (RFE) team in Mu-
nich; and the White House refusal to fo-
cus on the plight of Budapest during the
Suez crisis created a “perfect storm”—
encouraging the Hungarian Revolution
without any serious thought of ever sup-
porting it. This would not have been so
painful had not 96 percent of all Hun-
garians, most of whom ravenously de-
voured the RFE reports, thought that the
United States would provide unlimited
support for the revolution.
This account certainly warrants reading
by history buffs and public policy mak-
ers alike. Gati has a way of personalizing
the day-by-day accounts of the action in
Budapest that makes for an easy read.
However, the reader is left with a series
of provocative questions. What made the
Soviet politburo overturn its decision
and ultimately send in tanks to Hun-
gary? Was Washington capable of focus-
ing on more than one flash point at a
time? Would at least one fluent
Hungarian-speaking CIA agent in Hun-
gary have made a difference in U.S. pol-
icy? Fortunately for his readership, Gati
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Michael D. Pearlman retired in 2006 as
professor of history at the Army Com-
mand and General Staff College. He
now offers a complete history of the po-
litical, diplomatic, and military factors
leading to President Harry S. Truman’s
April 1951 firing of General Douglas
MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Far
East. A presentation at times overdone
for general readers, this scholarly work
will interest those who specialize in
American strategic and diplomatic deci-
sion making from post–World War II
through the Korean War.
Problems between Truman and his
viceroy in Asia began early in the Ko-
rean War. In August 1950 Truman or-
dered MacArthur to rescind a public
statement sent to the annual conven-
tion of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, in
which MacArthur advocated preserving
Taiwan for a future attack on mainland
China. This statement was in direct
conflict with White House policy to
keep the war in Korea limited.
Late in December 1950, after the Chi-
nese attacked across the Yalu River in
Korea, MacArthur responded to a Joint
Chiefs of Staff message with a
counterproposal. He advocated these
decisive destructive blows: a blockade
of Chinese coastal areas, destruction of
Chinese industrial capacities to wage
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war, and Nationalist Chinese forces to
counterattack on the mainland.
Early in 1951, when the Chinese com-
munist forces began to falter in the face
of tougher American and allied resis-
tance, MacArthur became bolder and
attacked the Truman administration’s
concept of limited war in Korea. On 24
March MacArthur preempted the ad-
ministration by announcing his willing-
ness to negotiate with enemy
commanders.
Truman conferred with his key advisers
and a consensus emerged that MacAr-
thur’s insubordination called for his
dismissal. The occasion, though not the
cause, was a letter from MacArthur to
Joseph Martin, the senior Republican in
the House of Representatives. The let-
ter, which praised a speech of Martin’s
calling for a second front in China, was
read into The Congressional Record on 5
April. Six days later, MacArthur was
fired.
Pearlman’s credentials are manifest. He
has produced a thorough account of de-
cision making, bureaucratic and parti-
san politics, and old grudges and
resentments. The latter are sometimes
extraneous, but to his credit, he also ex-
amines another aspect of the Korean
conflict—events behind closed doors in
Beijing and Moscow. The work offers
valuable information on Sino-Soviet re-
lations during this period, though the
author might have expanded on this
subject beyond the limited issues of Sta-
lin’s fear of an American nuclear attack
and his sales of arms to Mao Tse-tung.
In sum, this is a first-rate research effort
by a distinguished historian, writing in
a lively style that somewhat counterbal-
ances the book’s density, and of consid-
erable value and interest to students of
the period.
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